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Abstract 
Hundreds of studies have failed to establish the effects of decentralisation on a number of 
important policy goals.  This paper examines the cases of Bolivia and Colombia to explore 
decentralisation’s effects on government responsiveness and poverty-orientation.  I first 
summarize economic data on the effects of decentralisation in each.  In Bolivia, 
decentralisation made government more responsive by re-directing public investment to areas 
of greatest need.  In Colombia, municipalities increased investment significantly as 
decentralisation deepened, while running costs fell.  In both countries, investment shifted 
from economic production and infrastructure to social services and human capital formation.  
Resources were rebalanced in favour of poorer districts.  The contrast between the two also 
highlights four important lessons.  In order for decentralisation to work well, (i) local 
democracy must be free, fair, transparent and competitive; (ii) sub-national governments 
must face hard budget constraints; (iii) central government must be scaled back; and (iv) 
significant tax-raising powers must be devolved to the periphery.  Where all four conditions 
obtain, decentralising resources and political authority can generate real accountability 
where none existed before, and improve the quality of government a society achieves. 
 
Introduction 
Over the past few decades, decentralisation has become one of the most debated policy issues 
throughout both developing and developed worlds.  It is seen as central to the development 
efforts of countries as far afield as Chile, China, Guatemala and Nepal; and in the multiple 
guises of subsidiarity, devolution and federalism it is also squarely in the foreground of policy 
discourse in the US, UK and EU.  But surprisingly, there is little agreement concerning the 
effects of decentralisation in the empirical literature.  Advocates argue that decentralisation 
can make government more responsive to the governed by “tailoring levels of consumption to 
the preferences of smaller, more homogeneous groups”. 1  Opponents dispute this, arguing that 
                                                 
* This research was financed by the World Bank Research Committee and the DFID-LSE Crisis States 
Programme.  I am very grateful to Carolina Mejía for expert research assistance, and to Pranab Bardhan, Tim 
Besley, Teddy Brett, Shanta Devarajan, James Dunkerley, John Harriss, Luis Felipe López, Mauricio Merino, 
Ken Shadlen and seminar participants at the CSP-Delhi and UNDP-Mexico meetings for their thoughtful 
suggestions.  I owe a special debt of gratitude to my collaborators in the Decentralisation, Local Governance 
and Violence in Colombia project: Marcela Ceballos, CODHES, Diana Hoyos and Fabio Sánchez.  All 
remaining errors are my own. 
1 J. J. Wallis & W. E. Oates, ‘Decentralization in the Public Sector: An Empirical Study of State and Local 
Government’, in H. S. Rosen (ed.), Fiscal Federalism: Quantitative Studies, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1988, p.5. See also, for example: E. Ostrom et.al., Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development: 
Infrastructure Policies in Perspective, Boulder: Westview Press, 1993; R. D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: 
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993; World Bank, World Development 
Report: Infrastructure for Development, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994; UNDP, Informe Sobre 
Desarrollo Humano 1993, Madrid: CIDEAL, 1993. 
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local governments are too susceptible to elite capture, and too lacking in technical, human and 
financial resources, to produce a heterogeneous range of public services that are both 
reasonably efficient and responsive to local demand.2  But neither side is able to substantiate 
its arguments convincingly with empirical evidence. 
Consider the broadest surveys of decentralisation experiences.  In their wide-ranging 1983 
survey, Rondinelli, Cheema and Nellis note that decentralisation has seldom, if ever, lived up 
to expectations.  Most developing countries implementing decentralisation experienced 
serious administrative problems.  Although few comprehensive evaluations of the benefits 
and costs of decentralisation efforts have been conducted, those that were attempted indicate 
limited success in some countries but not others.3  A decade and a half later, surveys by 
Piriou-Sall, Manor and Smoke come to cautiously positive conclusions, but with caveats 
about the strength of the evidence in decentralisation’s favour.  Manor ends his study with the 
judgment that “while decentralization …is no panacea, it has many virtues and is worth 
pursuing”, after noting that the evidence, though extensive, is still incomplete.  Smoke asks 
whether there is empirical justification for pursuing decentralisation, and finds the evidence is 
mixed and anecdotal. 4  The lack of progress is striking. 
This paper examines some of the key questions on decentralisation by comparing the 
remarkable case of Bolivia with the more complex case of Colombia.  It compares the results 
from a significant amount of mature research on Bolivia,5 with much more preliminary work 
on Colombia arising from the LSE-DFID-Los Andes project on Decentralisation, Local 
Governance and Violence.  The conclusions  I am able to reach are accordingly much stronger 
and better founded for the Bolivian case than Colombia.  Nonetheless, as we shall see, teasing 
out the similarities and differences between the two is a revealing exercise in and of itself.  
Furthermore, focusing on two broadly similar countries in the same region limits problems of 
data comparability, and geographic and cultural context.  Bolivia is particularly deserving of 
study because reform there consisted of a large change in policy at a discrete point in time.  
Colombia, however, is more relevant for many middle- income countries because of its 
wealth, level of development, and relatively high state capacity. 
I define decentralisation as the devolution by central (i.e. national) government of specific 
functions, with all of the administrative, political and economic attributes that these entail, to 
democratic local (i.e. municipal) governments that are independent of the centre within a 
legally delimited geographic and functional domain.  The rest of the paper is organised as 
follows.  Section 2 reviews the Bolivian and Colombian decentralisation programmes, 
focusing on their legal and budgetary aspects.  Section 3 provides summarised analysis of the 
economic outcomes of decentralisation in each country.  Section 4 summarises the effects of 
                                                 
2 See, for example: R. C. Crook & A. S. Sverrisson, ‘To What Extent Can Decentralized Forms of Government 
Enhance the Development of Pro -Poor Policies and Improve Poverty-Alleviation Outcomes?’, Manuscript, 
1999; J. Samoff, ‘Decentralization: The Politics of Interventionism’, Development and Change, 21 (1990), 
pp.513-530; B. Smith, Decentralization: The Territorial Dimension of the State, London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1985. 
3 D. A. Rondinelli et al., ‘Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience’, World 
Bank Staff Working Paper No. 581, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1983. 
4 S. Piriou-Sall, ‘Decentralization and Rural Development: A Review of Evidence’, Washington, DC: 
Manuscript, 1998; J. Manor, The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization, Washington, DC: The 
World Bank, 1999; and P. Smoke, ‘Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Current 
Concepts and Practice’, Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Programme Paper No.2.  Geneva: 
UNRISD, 2001. 
5 See, for example: J. P. Faguet, ‘Does Decentralization Increase Responsiveness to Local Needs? Evidence from 
Bolivia’, Journal of Public Economics, 88 (2004), pp.867-894. 
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reform in Bolivia and Colombia, and concludes with four lessons that the two cases provide 
for other countries that seek to decentralise. 
 
The Bolivian and Colombian Decentralisation Programmes 
Popular Participation in Bolivia 
On the eve of revolution, Bolivia was a poor, backward country with extreme levels of 
inequality, presided over by a “typical racist state in which the non-Spanish speaking 
indigenous peasantry was controlled by a small, Spanish speaking white elite, [their power] 
based ultimately on violence more than consensus or any social pact”. 6  The nationalist 
revolution of 1952, which expropriated the “commanding heights” of the economy, land and 
mines, launched Bolivia on the road to one of the most centralised state structures in the 
region.  The government embarked upon a state- led modernisation strategy in which public 
corporations and regional governments initiated a concerted drive to break down provincial 
fiefdoms, transform existing social relations, and create a modern, industrial, more egalitarian 
society. 7  To this end the President directly appointed Prefects, who in turn designated entire 
regional governments and associated dependencies, forming a national chain of cascading 
authority emanating from the capital.  
The intellectual trends of the 1950s-1970s – Dependencia theory, Import Substitution 
Industrialisation, and Developmentalism – contributed to the centralising tendency, as did the 
military governments which overthrew elected administrations with increasing frequency 
from the 1960s on. 8  With political power so little dispersed, there was little point in 
establishing the legal and political instruments of local governance.  As a result, beyond the 
nine regional capitals (including La Paz) and an additional 25-30 cities, local government 
existed in Bolivia at best in name, as an honorary and ceremonial institution devoid of 
administrative capability and starved for funds; and in most of the country it did not exist at 
all. 
Although the 1994 reform was sprung on an unsuspecting nation, the concept of 
decentralisation was by no means new.  For more than 30 years a decentralisation debate 
focused on Bolivia’s nine departments ebbed and flowed politically – at times taking on 
burning importance, other times all but forgotten.  The issue became caught up in the 
country’s centrifugal tensions, as regional elites in Santa Cruz and Tarija consciously 
manipulated the threat of secession to Brazil and Argentina respectively – with which each is 
economically more integrated than La Paz – to extract resources from the centre.  The 
Bolivian paradox of a highly centralised but weak state, and a socially diverse population with 
weak national identity, meant that such threats were taken seriously by the political class, 
which blocked all moves to devolve more power and authority to Bolivia’s regions. 
So what spurred the change of tack, and why then?  Two factors stand out.  The less important 
one arises from Bolivia’s failure to achieve sustained, healthy growth despite wrenching 
economic reform overseen by the IMF and World Bank.  Fifteen years of near-zero per capita 
economic growth sapped the credibility of the state and fomented social unrest.  The new 
Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR) administration of President Sánchez de Lozada 
saw the structure of government itself as an impediment to growth.  Decentralisation was an 
                                                 
6 H. Klein, Historia de Bolivia , La Paz: Libreria-Editorial Juventud, 1993, p.237 – my translation. 
7 J. Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins: Political Struggle in Bolivia 1952-82, London: Verso, 1984. 
8 Klein (1993). 
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attempt to deepen structural reform in order to make the state more efficient and responsive to 
the population, and so regain its legitimacy in the voters’ eyes. 
The more important factor arises from the rise of ethnically-based, populist politics in the 
1980s, which undercut the MNR’s traditional dominance of the rural vote, and posed a serious 
challenge to its (self-declared) role as the ‘natural party of government’.  This rural 
dominance was itself born out of the MNR’s agrarian reforms of the 1952-53 revolution.  
Hence a party with a tradition of radical reform, which found itself in secular decline, sought 
a second, re-defining moment.  In a typically bold move, it sought to reorganise government, 
re-cast the relationship between citizens and the state, and so win back the loyalty of 
Bolivians living outside major cities.  To a very important extent, decentralisation was a 
gambit to capture rural voters for at least another generation. 9 
Against this background, the Bolivian decentralisation reform was announced in 1994.  The 
Law of Popular Participation (LPP), developed almost in secret by a small number of 
technocrats,10 was announced to the nation to general surprise, followed by ridicule, followed 
by determined opposition of large parts of society. 11  It is notable that opposition to the law, 
which was fierce for a few months, came principally from the teachers’ union, NGOs and 
other social actors, and not from political parties.  Based on their public declarations, the 
position of the former was an incoherent mix of accusations and fears that denoted a deep 
suspicion of the government’s motives, and not a careful reading of the law.  The lack of 
opposition from parties can largely be attributed to the sweeping reforms that were being 
enacted by the MNR government at the same time as decentralisation.  With privatisation of 
the main state enterprises, education reform, and a comprehensive restructuring of the 
executive branch all being pushed at once, decentralisation was relegated to the second tier of 
political parties’ concerns.  The opposition focused its attention elsewhere, and it never 
became a fighting point. 
First made public in January of that year, the law was promulgated by Congress in April and 
implemented from July.  The scale of the change in resource flows and political power that it 
brought about were enormous.  The core of the law consists of four points:12 
· Resource Allocation.  Funds devolved to municipalities doubled to 20 percent of all 
national tax revenue.  More importantly, allocation amongst municipalities switched 
from unsystematic, highly political criteria to a strict per capita basis; 
· Responsibility for Public Services.  Ownership of local infrastructure in education, 
health, irrigation, roads, sports and culture was given to municipalities, with the 
concomitant responsibility to maintain, equip and administer these facilities, and 
invest in new ones; 
                                                 
9 At the time MNR strategists gleefully predicted such a result.  They proved wrong. 
10 D. Tuchschneider, ‘Una Visión desde la Planificación Participativa Municipal’, in Grupo DRU, UIA-SNPP, 
Participación Popular: Avances y Obstáculos, G. Rojas (ed.), La Paz: CID, 1996. 
11 ‘Injertos Tramposos en ‘Participación Popular’, Hoy, 19 January 1994; ‘La Declaratoria de Guerra del Primer 
Mandatario’, La Razon, 27 January 1994; and ‘Arrogancia Insultante’, Presencia, 27 February 1994 are only 
three of the many articles which appeared in the Bolivian press documenting popular reaction to the ‘Damned 
Law’.  These are documented in Unidad de Comunicación, Secretaría Nacional de Participación Popular, Debate 
Nacional sobre la Ley de Participación Popular, La Paz: Secretaría Nacional de Participación Popular, 1995. 
12 Secretaría Nacional de Participación Popular, Ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible y Medio Ambiente, Ley de 
Participación Popular, Reglamento de las Organizaciones Territoriales de Base, La Paz, 1994. 
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· Oversight Committees (Comités de Vigilancia) were established to provide an 
alternative channel for representing popular demand in the policy-making process. 
Composed of representatives from local, grass-roots groups, these bodies propose 
projects and oversee municipal expenditure.  Their ability to have disbursements of 
Popular Participation funds suspended if they find funds are being misused or stolen 
can paralyse local government, and gives them real power; 
· Municipalisation.  Existing municipalities were expanded to include suburbs and 
surrounding rural areas, and 198 new municipalities (out of 311 in all) were created. 
The change in local affairs that these measures catalysed is immense.  Before reform local 
government was absent throughout the vast majority of Bo livian territory, and the broader 
state present at most in the form of a military garrison, schoolhouse or health post, each 
reporting to its respective ministry.  After reform, elected local governments sprouted 
throughout the land. 
The terrain in which they sprouted was of course very different from place to place – power 
and resources were decentralised to huge cities and tiny villages, at the tops of mountains, 
deep in the jungle, and everywhere in between.  In order to try to establish common minimum 
technical and administrative standards in local public management, central government 
launched a series of capacity-building programmes aimed at teaching municipalities how to 
draw up a budget, contracts, manage public funds, raise local revenues, and manage 
personnel, amongst others.  These programmes were available to all municipalities, but aimed 
disproportionately at poorer, less experienced ones.  The long-term aim was clearly to nudge 
municipalities towards greater efficiency and economic self-sufficiency. 
The Decentralisation Process in Colombia 
Like Bolivia, Colombia was traditionally a highly centralised country, with mayors and 
governors directly named by central government.  Governors, in particular, were the 
President’s hombres de confianza, and carried out his will in the regions.  But unlike Bolivia’s 
‘big bang’ reform, decentralisation in Colombia developed over the years as a much more 
gradual, incremental process.  Hoyos and Ceballos identify three broad phases:13 
· Phase 1 began in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and included a number of fiscal 
measures aimed at strengthening municipal finances.  Most important of these were 
Law 14 of 1983 and Law 12 of 1986, which assigned to municipalities increased 
powers of tax collection, including especially sales tax, and established parameters for 
the investment of these funds; 
· Phase 2, which began in the mid-1980s, was more concerned with political and 
administrative matters.  Amongst the most important of these measures was Law 11 of 
1986, which regulated the popular election of mayors and sought to promote popular 
participation in local public decision-making via Juntas Administradoras Locales, 
amongst others.  Reforms enshrined in the 1991 constitution, such as citizens’ 
initiatives, municipal planning councils, open cabildos, the ability to revoke mayoral 
mandates, referenda, and popular consultations, further deepened political 
decentralisation.  The 1991 constitution also established the popular election of 
governors; 
                                                 
13 D. Hoyos & M. Ceballos, ‘Decentralisation and local democracy in Colombia: The evolution of electoral 
behaviour 1988-2000’, Manuscript, 2003. 
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· Phase 3 consisted of a number of laws that regulated the new constitution, and other 
fiscal and administrative reforms of the period.  These laws assigned greater 
responsibility to municipalities for the provision of public services and social 
investment, and provided additional resources for the same by increasing central 
government transfers to local governments significantly.  The laws mandate that the 
bulk of transferred funds should be spent on education and health, with little discretion 
left to local governments.  Automatic transfers to regional governments rose from 
about 20% to over 40% of total government spending, placing Colombia third in the 
region after the two big federal countries, Brazil and Argentina.14 
The aggregate effect of two decades of political and fiscal reforms was a large increase in the 
authority and operational independence of Colombia’s municipal governments, accompanied 
by a huge rise in the resources they controlled.  Municipalities were allowed to raise and 
spend significant sums of their own taxes, central-to- local government transfers increased 
more than three fold,15 and municipal governments were permitted to issue public debt.  
Overall municipal expenditures and investments rose from 2.8% to 8.3% of GDP, as detailed 
in figure 1.  This rise was due entirely to increased investment, while running costs remained 
stable over the period. 
Figure 1 
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Source: Decentralisation, Local Governance and Violence project 
 
What drove decentralisation in Colombia?  As befits a much longer and more elaborate 
process, we cannot limit the motivating factors of reform to a few discrete goals.  Hoyos and 
Ceballos group the many reasons into two categories.  The first of these is the challenge of 
political instability.  Colombia is a violent country – much more so than Bolivia – with a 
long history of civil conflict, armed rebellion, persistently high levels of ‘common’ crime, and 
the use of violence as an explicit tool of political mobilization.  The late 1970s saw levels of 
violence rise again as the internal conflict intensified.  At the same time, social protests and 
pressures from regional groups multiplied, linked to the central state’s inability to meet 
demands for social services and public investment.  Secondly, the political hegemony  over 
the instruments of the state of the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties began to be 
                                                 
14 Alesina et.al., ‘Decentralization in Colombia’, Fedesarrollo Working Paper No.15, Bogotá: Fedesarrollo, 
2000.  The regional average is 15%. 
15 Sánchez et.al., 2000, show that central transfers grew from 2% of GDP in 1990 to almost 7% in 1997. 
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seen more and more as a liability – less the solution to a previous round of civil violence (La 
Violencia) and more a cause of the next one.  Colombians from across the political spectrum 
became convinced that the inability of the state to respond to society’s demands – and its 
outright absence in many areas (the ‘internal frontier’), combined with the waning legitimacy 
of an arbitrarily restricted democracy, 16 were leading to public sector inefficiencies, civic 
discontent, and ultimately armed violence. 
Thus from the start, decentralisation in Colombia was a multi- faceted tool designed to serve a 
combination of purposes particular to Colombia’s troubled democracy.  Through it, policy 
elites sought to increase the levels of electoral and citizen participation within the existing 
institutional framework.  They sought to open the political system via popular elections at the 
regional and local levels, where they hoped new parties and movements would emerge and 
eventually assume power, so breaking the liberal-conservative hegemony over the resources 
of the state. 
 
The Impacts of Decentralisation 
The Impact of Decentralisation in Bolivia 
The extent of the change is perhaps best appreciated by examining the changes in resource 
flows it catalysed.  Figure 2 shows that before decentralisation 308 Bolivian municipalities 
divided amongst them a mere 14% of all devolved funds, while the three main cities took 
86%.  After decentralisation their shares reversed to 73% and 27% respectively.  The per 
capita criterion resulted in a massive shift of resources in favour of smaller, poorer districts. 
 
Figure 2 
 
% of National 
Total 
City 1993 1995 % Change 1993 1995 
La Paz 114,292 61,976 -46% 51% 10% 
Santa Cruz 51,278 63,076 23% 23% 10% 
Cochabamba 25,856 38,442 49% 12% 6% 
3 Cities  Sub-total 191,427 163,494 -15% 86% 27% 
Rest of Bolivia 32,099 444,786 1286% 14% 73% 
Total 223,525 608,280 172% 100% 100% 
N.B. Average exchange rate: US$1=Bs.5 
The Changing Allocation of Public Funds 
Central-to-Local 
Revenue Sharing (Bs'000) 
 
Source: Original calculations; database compiled from official Bolivian sources. 
 
 
                                                 
16 The Frente Nacional  (1957-74) quelled La Violencia by sharing out the fruits of power equally between 
Liberals and Conservatives, and restricting electoral competition to those two parties. 
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Figure 3 
 
Local v. Central Government Investment 
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 
Education 
Urban Dev't 
Water & San. 
Transport 
Health 
Energy 
Agriculture 
Water Mgt. 
Multisectoral 
Communications 
Industry 
Hydrocarbons 
Se
ct
or
 
% Total Investment 
Local 
Central 
 
Source: Original calculations; database compiled from official Bolivian sources. 
 
 
A more important and telling change was to the composition of investment.  Figure 3 shows 
central and local government investment by sector for the periods 1991-93 and 1994-96.  The 
differences are large.  In the years leading up to reform, central government invested most in 
transport, hydrocarbons, multisectoral17 and energy, which together accounted for 73% of 
public investment during 1991-93.  Following decentralisation, local governments have 
invested most heavily in education, urban development, and water and sanitation, together 
accounting for 79% of municipal investment.  Of the sectors accounting for roughly three 
quarters of total investment in both cases, central and local government have not even one in 
common.  The evidence implies that local and central government have very different 
investment priorities.  Call this Bolivia’s ‘decentralisation stylised fact 1’. 
It is also instructive to examine how investment was distributed geographically among 
Bolivia’s municipalities before and after decentralisation.  Figures 4 to 6 give us a rough 
sense of this by placing Bolivia’s municipalities along the horizontal axis and measuring 
investment per capita as vertical displacement.  A highly skewed allocation would appear as a 
few points strewn across the top of the graph, with most lying on the bottom; an equitable 
distribution would appear as a band of points at some intermediate level.   
                                                 
17 A hodgepodge, including feasibility studies, technical assistance and emergency relief, that is difficult to 
categorise. 
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Figure 4: Investment per capita, 1991-93 
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Figure 5: Investment per capita, 1991-93 
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Figure 6: Local Investment per capita, 1994-96 
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Source: Original calculations; database compiled from official Bolivian sources. 
 
What does the data show?  Figure 4 shows that per capita investment before decentralisation 
was indeed highly unequal, with large investments in three districts and the vast majority at or 
near zero.  Figure 5 corrects for the skewing effect of the highest observations by excluding 
the upper twelve and showing only those below Bs.2000 per capita.  Though the distribution 
now appears less unequal, there is still monotonically increasing density as we move 
downwards, with fully one-half of all observations on or near the horizontal axis.  Investment 
under centralised government was thus hugely skewed in favour of a few municipalities that 
received enormous sums, a second group where investment was significant, and the 
unfortunate half of districts that received nothing.  Compare this with figure 6, which shows 
municipal investment after decentralisation.  This chart shows no district over Bs.700/capita, 
a broad band with greatest density between Bs.100-200 per capita, and only a few points 
touching the axis.  Average municipal investment for this period is Bs.208/capita, and thus the 
band contains the mean. 18  These crude indicators imply that central government, with a much 
larger budget and free rein over all of Bolivia’s municipalities, chose a very unequal 
distribution of investment across space, while decentralised government distributes public 
investment much more evenly throughout the country.  This is stylised fact no.2. 
A third stylised fact uses econometric models of public investment to show that 
decentralisation increased government responsiveness to real local needs.19  After 1994, 
investment in education, water and sanitation, water management, and agriculture was a 
positive function of illiteracy rates, water and sewerage non-connection rates, and 
malnutrition rates respectively.  That is to say, although investment in these sectors increased 
throughout Bolivia after decentralisation, the increases were disproportionate in those districts 
where the objective need for such services was greatest.  I argue that these changes were 
driven by the actions of Bolivia’s 250 smallest, poorest, mostly rural municipalities investing 
                                                 
18 Investment sums here are much lower because they exclude central government funds. 
19 Faguet (2004). 
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newly devolved public funds in their highest-priority projects.  Detailed econometric models 
showing these results for education are provided in Annex 1. 
The fourth stylised fact uses a similar technique to show that centralised investment was 
economically regressive, concentrating public investment in richer municipalities and 
ignoring poorer ones.20  Decentralisation, by contrast, shifted resources towards poorer 
districts; after 1994, public investment rose in municipalities where indicators of wealth and 
income are lower.  The four stylised facts are summarised as follows:  
1. Decentralisation shifted public investment into social services and human capital 
formation, at the expense of economic production and infrastructure; 
2. Decentralisation distributed investment more equally across space; 
3. Decentralisation made investment more responsive to local needs; 
4. Decentralisation shifted investment towards poorer districts. 
 
The Impact of Decentralization in Colombia 
For the purposes of this paper, 1993 is the base year, after which full decentralisation was 
rolled out throughout the country.  This view takes account of the piecemeal nature of 
Colombia’s earliest decentralisation measures in the 1970s and 1980s, and considers that 
‘real’ decentralisation did not begin until the full raft of reforms included in the 1991 
constitution, plus accompanying regulatory laws, were promulgated.  Before 1991-92 there 
was undoubtedly a decentralising process underway in Colombia.  But it is a mistake to 
consider pre-1991 Colombia to be ‘decentralised’.  This study accordingly counts 1993 as 
Colombia’s first full year of decentralisation.  Focusing on the decade that begins with 1993 
allows us to examine the full process as it evolved and the full implications of these deep 
reforms took hold. 
As for Bolivia, statistics from Colombia tell an eloquent story.  Figure 7 plots municipal 
investment and running costs as a percentage of total municipal resources.  We see that the 
ratio of investment to running costs rose from rough parity (55:45) to more than 4:1.  Figure 8 
details municipal investment and personnel costs in cons tant pesos.  While invested sums rose 
steadily to over four times their initial values, personnel costs remained essentially constant.  
This refutes critics who claim that decentralisation leads to increased bureaucracy at the 
expense of productive investment.  It also refutes those who say that inexperienced or 
politically captured local governments will go on a hiring spree, so wasting scarce resources.  
The numbers tell the opposite tale: as decentralisation advanced and reform deepened, 
municipalities dedicated more and more of their resources to public investment, and less and 
less to operating costs; and they did it without increasing the payroll. 
                                                 
20 J. P. Faguet, ‘The Determinants of Central vs. Local Government Investment: Institutions and Politics Matter’, 
DESTIN Working Paper No.02-38, London School of Economics, 2002, at: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/destin/workpapers/determinants-of-central.pdf.  
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Figure 7: Municipal Investment and Operating Costs as % of Total Resources 
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How was this increasing investment budget spent?  Figure 10 shows the share of aggregate 
municipal investment corresponding to education, health and water, year by year.  The share 
of investment in education rose by two-thirds over the period, while that of health more than 
doubled.  Investment in potable water decreased modestly.  But perhaps these numbers are 
biased by a few big cities?  Figure 10 shows unweighted municipal averages (i.e. where all 
municipalities are treated equally) of investment shares in order to correct for any possible 
such biases.  For simplicity I focus on two categories, health and personnel.  The graph 
confirms the trends identified above.  The share of municipal resources dedicated to health 
rose seven-fold, while that spent on personnel fell by half.  These figures contradict those who 
claim that local government is too ignorant, corrupt, or inept to invest in basic social services, 
which should be left instead to a wiser and more technocratic central government.  
Decentralisation coincided with an increase in social investment locally, and as 
decentralisation deepened the trend accelerated. 
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Figure 9: Composition of investment (% of total) 
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Figure 10: Unweighted Average of Municipal Expenditure Shares 
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Dealing in investment shares to some extent obscures the scale of the changes that occurred in 
Colombia.  Figure 11 shows investment by sector in billions of constant 2000 pesos, and 
allows us to compare social investment (i.e. human capital formation) with investment in 
physical infrastructure.  We see that education, health and water investment rose between 
three and seven times in constant peso terms, while investment in roads doubled and housing 
remained broadly stable.  Assuming that 1993 represents the end of the centralised regime, we 
can conclude that under decentralisation investment in social services and human capital 
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formation increased significantly at the expense of physical infrastructure, again the opposite 
of what many of decentralisation’s critics contend. 
 
Figure 11: Municipal Investment in Constant Terms  
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But decentralisation was not entirely trouble-free for Colombia.  During the period in 
question, Colombia’s stock of public debt doubled and interest payments tripled.  This formed 
part of a deteriorating fiscal performance from the mid-1990s onwards, which led Colombia 
to sign a formal agreement with the IMF for the first time in its history, in an attempt to stem 
capital flight and ease pressure on the peso.  Colombia suffered its most serious recession in 
three generations.  Alesina and others have blamed this fiscal deterioration largely on 
unbalanced local-central government fiscal relationships.21 
It is a matter of record that decentralisation was followed by significant borrowing by sub-
national governments, and then a string of bankruptcies, which ultimately cost the national 
treasury dearly.22 It is also true that fiscal imbalances between central and state governments 
in Argentina and Brazil, including especially an implicit, political guarantee of sub-sovereign 
debt, contributed significantly to the recent Argentine economic collapse, and to Brazilian 
financial instability in the late 1990s.  But is important to remember that in Colombia the 
economic events in question occurred during an extraordinary period.  President Samper 
stood accused by the United States of having been elected with drug money.  As American 
economic sanctions took their toll and Colombians poured into the streets demonstrating 
against their government, the administration undertook a comprehensive campaign to win the 
support of political and regional elites.  The costs of this campaign were considerable, and 
added significantly to Colombia’s fiscal woes.  Within Colombia, many commentators have 
accused the Samper administration of failing to scale back the central state as decentralisation 
demands, in order to wield more political patronage.  Disentangling the effects of this crisis in 
                                                 
21 Alesina et.al. (2000). 
22 Alesina et al. (2000).   
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legitimacy from those of decentralisation per se is a complex task.  Suffice it to say that a 
decentralisation programme with built- in, unnecessary fiscal imbalances contributed to 
Colombia’s fiscal problems of the late 1990s, but is not solely responsible for them. 
Conclusions and Recommendations  
What lessons can we draw from Bolivia and Colombia?  In both countries, decentralisation 
made government more responsive by re-directing public investment to areas of greatest need 
– e.g. Bolivian investment in education and water and sanitation rose after 1994, where 
illiteracy rates were higher and water and sewerage connection rates lower, respectively.  By 
shifting resources towards poorer districts, decentralisation made investment much more 
equitable across space.  Uses of public monies shifted in both countries from economic 
production and infrastructure to social services and human capital formation.  In Bolivia, it is 
impressive that these shifts in national investment aggregates were driven by the smallest, 
poorest municipalities investing newly-devolved resources in their highest-priority projects.  
Something similar is probably also true for Colombia. 
It is useful to reconstruct both countries’ decentralisation stories from the ground up.  In both, 
decentralisation created of hundreds of local governments throughout the country.  These 
proved more sensitive to local conditions, and more accessible to lobbying and grass-roots 
pressure, than a central administration that simply abandoned large expanses of territory as 
convenience dictated.  Decentralisation engaged thousands of neighbourhood councils, 
peasant communities, ayllus, mallkus, and Juntas de Acción Comunal, as well as interest 
groups and business associations that previously had little voice in how their communities 
were run.  By locating real resources and political power in municipal institutions it reached 
out to rich and poor strata alike, offering them the means to improve their lives, and a 
concrete incentive to participate. 
In both countries, reform changed not only the form of government but also its substance.  
Those central officials stationed beyond national and regional capitals before decentralisation 
had little incentive to concern themselves with local demands.  Career success was 
determined by ministerial fiat unrelated to local outcomes in distant districts.  Business 
interests and the rich might eventually hope to gain some favours from the centre, but 
throughout most of the country ordinary citizens’ ordinary concerns were effectively shut out.  
Decentralisation changed this by creating local authorities beholden to local voters.  
Throughout the national territory it put real power over public resources in the hands of 
ordinary citizens; and it changed the way both countries are run. 
But decentralisation is no panacea.  It is entirely possible to do it badly.  It is here that the 
country comparison is most informative.  In Bolivia, the vote was in practice more restricted 
than Colombia.  Bolivia had further to go to make decentralisation – and indeed democracy – 
work.23  Fortunately, a number of systemic reforms were enacted in the 1980s and 1990s that 
paved the way to a well-ordered municipal system.  These increased transparency in the vote 
count, ensured voting secrecy, provided for independent oversight of the voting process, and 
increased the number of polling stations in rural areas.  But they also included non-electoral 
reforms, such as a new, efficient citizen registration process (which in turn permitted voter 
registration), and the extension of rural literacy programmes (especially amongst women).  
Their collective effects were a broad increase in voter registration and improved voter 
participation.  But the secret to the success of these reforms lay in large part with the design 
                                                 
23 J. P. Faguet, ‘Decentralizing the Provision of Public Services in Bolivia: Institutions, Political Competition 
and the Effectiveness of Local Government’, PhD Dissertation, London School of Economics, 2002. 
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of the decentralisation programme itself.  The LPP brought rural areas into the municipal 
system, and then devolved significant authority and political responsibility to them.  Whereas 
before rural dwellers voted, if at all, for cantonal officials who had neither resources nor 
political power, now fully-fledged municipal governments with real resources and legislative 
authority were at stake.  The prospect of gaining control over these drove political parties into 
the countryside in search of rural votes.  The prospect of benefiting from them pushed 
villagers and farmers into municipal politics and into the voting booth.  In this way the 
concerns and opinions of the previously ignored rural 50% of Bolivians were brought into the 
political mainstream, as electoral politics penetrated deeper and deeper into the hinterland.  
This, then, is the first lesson, and it is an important one.  In order for decentralisation to work 
well, local democracy must be free, fair, transparent and competitive. 
The second lesson, well illustrated in the Colombian experience, is a negative one.  In order 
for decentralisation to work well, sub-national governments must face hard budget 
constraints.  Reform programmes featuring automatic central guarantees of sub-national debt 
– whether legally explicit or politically implicit – lead to fiscal imbalances that can ultimately 
threaten the nation’s macroeconomic stability.  Colombia (as well as Argentina and Brazil) is 
a good example of this.  In Bolivia, by contrast, central government was too poor, and perhaps 
too wise, to guarantee municipal debt, and the few cities able to borrow were left to their own 
devices. 
To a large extent, hard budget constraints are implicit in the very definition of 
decentralisation.  By contrast, debt guarantees imply a continuing central intervention in local 
affairs that violates the functional independence that decentralization presupposes. Alesina 
et.al. suggest simply banning sub-national governments from taking on debt, allowing them 
only to ‘borrow’ against future Treasury disbursements.24  Another solution could be strict 
limits on borrowing levels and maturities; a third would be for the centre to simply refuse to 
bail out local governments.  This last option may well be politically impractical in many 
countries.  In any event, the precise form is less important than the principal – decentralisation 
requires hard budget constraints. 
The third lesson follows on from the second.  If decentralisation means devolving resources, 
responsibility and authority from higher to lower levels of government, then it also implies 
that the higher levels must be scaled back.  The central headcount must be reduced, as 
officials are transferred to regional and local governments, or simply fired.  Maintaining 
central government at full strength even as local governments grow in size and importance is 
a bad recipe, as Colombia discovered too late. 
The fourth lesson is also better illustrated in the case of Colombia, which not surprisingly has 
made more progress in this respect than Bolivia.  This is the importance of devolving 
significant tax-raising powers to the periphery.  In the first place, this provides more resources 
for local services.  Secondly, to the extent that public investments and expenditures imply a 
direct cost to the local economy, policy debates will weigh competing options more carefully, 
and better decisions will be made.  If local budgets come entirely from central- local transfers, 
by contrast, citizens may feel less ownership over municipal resources, and accordingly less 
interest in how they are spent.  This translates directly into less interest in local government 
generally, and less oversight and accountability. 
                                                 
24 Alesina et.al. (2000). 
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Getting these lessons right is of seminal importance to any decentralisation programme.  
Under the right circumstances, decentralising resources and political authority can generate 
real accountability where none existed before, and improve the quality of government a 
society achieves. 
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Annex 1 
Econometric Estimates of the Effect of Decentralisation on Education Investment 
 
Test:  b 2 –   b 1 =  z S m +  h 1 Z 1m + … +  h 5 Z 5m +  e m 
Independent Variable I II III IV V 
Private Sector PCV1 -0.000983 -0.00121 -0.00106 -0.0003 -0.00056 
(-2.466) (-3.004) (-2.689) (-1.004) (-1.619) 
Project Planning PCV1 -0.000538 -0.00049 -0.00055 -0.00037 -0.00052 
(-0.919) (-0.830) (-0.925) (-0.703) (-0.879) 
Civil Institutions PCV1 0.000973 0.00101 0.00103 
(1.752) (1.774) (1.839) 
Training & Capacity Building PCV1 -0.00063 
(-0.591) 
Information Technology PCV1 0.00118 
(1.010) 
Illiteracy Rate (Adult) 0.000173 0.00019 0.0002 
(2.906) (3.116) (3.306) 
Illiteracy Rate (Over-6's) 0.00018 
(2.505) 
Literacy Rate -0.00011 
(-1.844) 
Local Education Authority 0.005603 0.00534 0.00543 0.0053 0.00479 
(1.421) (1.356) (1.378) (1.354) (1.379) 
_constant 0.0075759 0.02037 0.00806 0.00722 0.00704 
(1.814) (3.728) (1.816) (1.862) (1.731) 
R-square 0.0176 0.0136 0.0162 0.0155 0.0172 
Prob>F 0.001 0.0025 0.0016 0.0128 0.0104 
* OLS regressions reported with robust standard errors 
    t-stats in parentheses; PCV1 = 1st pricipal component variable 
Model* 
 
Investment rises under decentralisation where the illiteracy rate is higher, and thus where need 
is greater.  This implies that local government is more sensitive to local need than central 
government.  This finding is not sensitive to specification or the measure of illiteracy used, as 
is evident in the above figure, where the literacy rate is significant and negative.  The results 
imply that the centre assesses local preferences less accurately than local government.  
Educational investment falls where the private sector is stronger, a finding which is again 
insensitive to specification.  This is most likely because private firms lobby for resources to 
flow to other sectors where they stand to profit more.  The results for urban development 
support this interpretation.  Civil Institutions, by contrast, lead to an increase in investment 
after decentralisation, suggesting grass roots support for education (i.e. parents worried about 
their children).  Participative planning methodologies have no effect on investment, nor do 
information technology or local training and capacity-building activities. 
 
 Other Working Papers in Series 
WP1 Crisis States Programme, ‘Concept and Research Agenda’ (April 2001) – Also available in Spanish 
WP2 Crisis States Programme, ‘Research Activities’ (April 2001) 
WP4 Crisis States Programme, ‘Research in Latin America’ (April 2001) – Also available in Spanish 
WP6 Dennis Rodgers, ‘Making Danger a Calling: Anthropology, violence, and the dilemmas of participant 
observation’ (September 2001) – Also available in Spanish 
WP7 Hugh Roberts, ‘Co -opting Identity: The manipulation of Berberism, the frustration of democratisation and the 
generation of violence in Algeria’ (December 2001) – Also available in Spanish 
WP9 Benedict Latto, ‘Governance and Conflict Management: Implications for donor intervention’ (February 2002) 
– Also available in Spanish 
WP10 Jo Beall, ‘The People Behind the Walls: Insecurity, identity and gated communities in Johannesburg’ 
(February 2002) – Also available in Spanish  
WP11 Jo Beall, Owen Crankshaw & Susan Parnell, ‘Social Differentiation and Urban Governance in Greater Soweto: 
A case study of post-Apartheid reconstruction’ (February 2002) – Also available in Spanish 
WP20 Jonathan DiJohn, ‘Mineral-Resource Abundance and Violent Political Conflict: A critical assessment of the 
rentier state model’ (December 2002) 
WP24 Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, ‘Hyper-fragmentation and Traditional Politics in Colombia: Discussing Alternative 
Explanations’ (March 2003, revised September 2004) – Also available in Spanish 
WP25 Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, ‘The Times of Democratic Involutions’ (March 2003, revised January 2005) – Also 
available in Spanish 
WP27 Francisco Gutiérre z Sanín, ‘Criminal Rebels? A discussion of war and criminality from the Colombian 
experience’ (April 2003) 
WP28 Luis Eduardo Fajardo, ‘From the Alliance for Progress to the Plan Colombia: A retrospective look at US aid to 
Colombia’ (April 2003) 
WP29 Jean-Paul Faguet, ‘Decentralisation and local government in Bolivia’ (May 2003) –Also available in Spanish  
WP30 Maria Emma Wills & Maria Teresa Pinto, ‘Peru’s failed search for political stability (June 2003) 
WP32 Carlos Medina & Hermes Martínez, ‘Violence and drug prohibition in Colombia’ (August 2003) 
WP35 Dennis Rodgers, ‘Dying For It: Gangs, Violence and Social Change in Urban Nicaragua’ (October 2003) 
WP37 David Keen, ‘Demobilising Guatemala’ (November 2003) 
WP38 Miguel García & Gary Hoskin, ‘Political Participation and War in Colombia: An Analysis of the 2002 
Elections’ (November 2003) 
WP40 Ann C. Mason, ‘Constructing Authority Alternatives in Colombia: Globalisation and the Transformation of 
Governance’ (February 2004) 
WP45 Kenneth C. Shadlen, ‘Representation, Participation and Development: Lessons from Small Industry in Latin 
America’ (June 2004) 
WP46 Jonathan DiJohn, ‘The Political Economy of Economic Liberalisation in Venezuela’ (June 2004) 
WP47 Ana María Díaz & Fabio Sánchez, ‘A Geography of Illicit Crops (Coca Leaf) and Armed Conflict in 
Colombia’ (July 2004) – Also available in Spanish  
WP51 Antonio Giustozzi, ‘“Good” States vs. “Bad” Warlords? A Critique of State-Building Strategies in 
Afghanistan’ (October 2004) 
WP52 Manorama Sharma, ‘Critically Assessing Traditions: The Case of Meghalaya’ (November 2004) 
WP53 Andries Bezuidenhout, ‘Postcolonial Workplace Regimes in the Engineering Industry in South Africa, 
Swaziland, and Zimbabwe’ (November 2004) 
WP54 Jo Beall, ‘Decentralisation and Engendering Democracy: Lessons from Local Government Reform in South 
Africa’ (November 2004) 
WP55 Laurie Nathan, ‘Security Communities and the Problem of Domestic Instability’ (November 2004)  
WP56 Angelika Rettberg, ‘Business-led Peacebuilding in Colombia: Fad or Future of a Country in Crisis?’ 
(December 2004) 
WP57 Diana Hoyos & Marcela Ceballos, ‘Tendencias del comportamiento electoral y descentralización en los 
municipios de Colombia, 1988-2000’ (December 2004) – English version forthcoming 
WP58 E. A. Brett, ‘From Corporatism to Liberalisation in Zimbabwe: Economic Policy Regimes and Political Crisis 
(1980-1997)’ (January 2005)  
WP59 Jo Beall, ‘Exit, Voice and Tradition: Loyalty to Chieftainship and Democracy in Metropolitan Durban, South 
Africa’ (January 2005) 
WP60 Manoj Srivastava, ‘Crafting Democracy and Good Governance in Local Arenas: Theory, Dilemmas and their 
Resolution through the Experiments in Madhya Pradesh, India?’ (April 2005) 
WP61 Dennis Rodgers, ‘Unintentional Democratisation? The Argentinazo  and the Politics of Participatory Budgeting 
in Buenos Aires, 2001-2004’ (April 2005) 
 
It is our intention for all Crisis States Working Papers eventually to be available in English, Spanish and French.  Some 
in the series have already been translated.   For further details , and an up to date list of Working Papers, and other Crisis 
States publications, please consult our website (www.crisisstates.com). 

